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Abstract 
 
 This thesis investigates the rationales of municipal co-financing. The introduction of 
passenger trains on the Söderås Line is used as a case study to investigate this concept. The 
empirical analysis is primarily based on 10 in-depth interviews – with decision makers, 
politicians and officials. Focus lies on Svalöv Municipality, who is co-financing the 
introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line (together with the other 
municipalities, the Region of Scania and the Swedish Transport Administration). 
Additionally, a questionnaire has been sent to Sweden’s 290 municipal mayors to examine 
if the patterns emerging from the in-depth interviews can be generalized.  
 It is concluded that municipal co-financing primarily is a way to distribute costs between 
the different agents who sign the agreement of co-financing. At the same time a large 
degree of information asymmetry is present. The Swedish Transport Administration is 
providing the calculations and the projections. Additionally, municipal co-financing is 
becoming increasingly common. In the case of the introduction of passenger trains on the 
Söderås Line, Municipal co-financing was required – as the project would otherwise not 
have been conducted.  
 
Key words: Municipal co-financing, The Swedish Transport Administration, bargaining, infrastructure, 
railway 
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1. Introduction 
 Municipal co-financing of large infrastructure projects has become increasingly common 
in Sweden (cf. SKL, 2014). This way of financing is based on the concept of cost-sharing. 
This means that costs of projects are covered by both the state, municipalities and, often, 
the county where the investment is made. Academic literature in this subject is scarce and 
we therefore investigate the underlying rationales of this way of financing.  
 In this thesis we examine the Söderås Line and the introduction of passenger train on the 
railway running through the north-west part of the Region of Scania (Scania County) in 
Southern Sweden. Clearly, new railway lines and updates of existing ones are associated 
with vast costs and great levels of cost uncertainty. Yet, they are often considered crucial 
for regional growth and economic development (cf. Banevjee, Duflo and Qian, 2012). In 
other words, many different opportunities might emerge from investments in 
infrastructure. Therefore, it is often considered to be of nationwide interest to give 
companies and residents access to a well-functioning railway system.  
 In Sweden, the agency responsible for the transport system is the Swedish Transport 
Administration. Large infrastructure investments in Sweden have historically been primarily 
state funded, but recently co-financing has become more prevalent (cf. SKL, 2011; Mellin 
et al, 2012). The Swedish Government Official Reports (SOU, 2011) highlight several 
fundamental reasons for co-financing. The main points in their report are listed below: 
 
1. A larger number of projects can be conducted 
2. Increased shared responsibility (edi. rem. between the different agents agreeing to co-finance 
the project) 
3. It gives the municipalities and the region increased influence on planning and execution of the 
countrywide infrastructure.  
4. More resources can lead to an acceleration of the foundation of existing project.  
SOU (2011, p.39-40) 
 
 Abovementioned points highlight that co-financing can result in more projects, and 
increase the volume of resources that can be used for such investments. Put differently, 
infrastructure projects can be financed through both municipal and state taxes. The report 
from the Swedish Government Official Reports (SOU, 2011) then continues and lists the 
following points that could have a positive effect on the willingness to co-finance project.  
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5. Some local benefits such as environmental, accessibility, estate values and regional development 
are not captured by traditional socioeconomic estimation methods.  
6. Municipal co-financing might decrease the risk of overestimation and underestimation of costs 
7. The investments can complement the state budget (were investments are granted on annual 
basis) 
8. There are possibilities to exploit the market benefits, mainly through usage fees, and this would 
decrease the public burden. 
9. Informal signals regarding co-financing sends out the message that co-financing decreases the 
risk for projects to be excluded from the national infrastructure plan. 
SOU (2011, p.39-40) 
 
 Still, there are different types of critique directed towards the concept of municipal co-
financing – despite the aforementioned justifications of co-financing and the incentives for 
municipalities (and regions) to co-finance. This critique is highlighted in this report, and 
some of the main points emerging from this analysis are listed below: 
 
1. A consequence of municipal co-financing could be that infrastructural investments are 
prioritized depending on the wealth of the municipalities; and not on the over-all societal 
benefits. 
2. The residents of the municipality that are co-financing a project is faced with a greater financial 
burden, as they are financing infrastructure through their taxes to the municipality, as well as 
through the taxes to the state.  
3. The relationship between the state and the municipality is uneven. The municipalities’ 
possibilities to influence the final contracts are limited.  
4. The possibility for the municipality to opt out from an investment is limited.  
5. The municipalities face larger budget limitations and are not always able to carry out 
independent cost-benefit analysis and future projections (this affecting the municipalities ability 
to make informed decisions) 
 These critical points highlight some rather crucial questions when analyzing the use of 
municipal co-financing to finance large infrastructure investments: What rationales lie behind 
municipal co-financing? How can this way of financing be criticized? And what positive effects are 
associated with this way of financing large infrastructure projects? 
 Answering those questions is important as we, as a society, are striving to use our 
resources in the best possible way. Using the agreement to co-finance the introduction of 
passenger trains on the Söderås Line as a case study to investigate the underlying 
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mechanisms of municipal co-financing allows us to put these different concepts into an 
actual case. It is important to note that the introduction of passenger trains has long been 
discussed. Politicians, and citizens, have demanded that passenger trains should traffic the 
route since early-90s (cf. Appendix 2). The decision to co-finance the introduction of 
passenger trains was then finally decided in 2014 as all co-financiers signed an agreement 
defining each participant’s role, investments and responsibilities in the project (Appendix 1, 
2014; Trafikverket 1, 2014) 
 Consequently, despite the fact that different objectives might exist for the state and the 
municipalities; for each agent the overlooking goal is to allocate their resources in the best 
possible way. Analyzing whether municipal co-financing is a societally desirable method of 
financing is crucial. Such attempts are scarce and clearly; this paper fills a knowledge void 
in the academic literature of the subject. 
1.1 Research question 
 The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the rationales of municipal co-financing by 
examining the incentives for the construction of the Söderås Line. 
 
What rationales lie behind municipal co-financing? 
     
 This research questions includes many different levels of analysis. Treating the different 
agents independently enables us to understand what information the different agents have 
and connect this to each agents ability to act rational. An important part of the question is 
the municipalities and the options they face - whether they have the information, the tools 
and the knowledge to make economically optimal decisions?  
 We therefore focus on the municipality of Svalöv and the negotiation and bargaining 
process when developing the partnership between all the involved agents; Swedish 
Transport Administration, Region of Scania, Municipality of Svalöv and the other 
municipalities. That is, focus lies on rationales to co-finance the construction of the 
Söderås Line from the perspective of Svalöv Municipality.  We ought to answer how the 
concept of municipal co-financing is connecting to economic literature, and whether this 
method of financing is based on mutual agreement and cooperation. Our hypothesis is that 
the municipalities can provide the Swedish Transport Administration with information 
regarding infrastructure investments in the local municipality. At the same time the 
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municipality knows what project they need, and are therefore willing to pay for the 
investment. This is resulting in greater decision making. 
1.2 Method 
  The decision to co-finance the introduction of passenger trains ultimately depend on local 
politicians; as well as the region of Scania and the government agency in charge of 
infrastructural maintenance, construction and planning - namely the Swedish Transport 
Administration. To understand the bargaining position, the negotiations and the underlying 
economic rationale we base this study primarily on in-depth interviews with decision 
makers and municipal officials. That is, we base our analysis on a qualitative approach. 
 The conducted interviews follow a script with pre-decided questions, which are linked, to 
an extensive literature analysis to frame the research. This literature is built upon the 
foundation of transport economics, behavioral economics, bargaining theory and 
investment literature. The structure of the interviews has been made taking Merriam 
(1988), Bewley (2002) and Quinn Patton (1990) into consideration. Additional policy 
papers that are analyzed include both notes from meetings regarding the decision to 
implement passenger trains on the Söderås Line and actual policy decisions agreed upon by 
local politicians and other agents. Finally, to put the analysis in a wider perspective, and to 
investigate the possibility for us to generalize our results, a questionnaire have been sent 
out to all mayors in Sweden’s 290 municipalities. 
 Throughout this thesis we are examining co-financing of large infrastructure projects. 
That is defined as projects in the National Transport Plan, and the cost of each these 
projects are exceeding a total of SEK 50 million (Trafikverket 3, 2010; Trafikverket 4, 
2014).  
1.3 Structure 
In this introductory chapter (Chapter 1) we have introduced our topic and the research 
question. In the next chapter (Chapter 2) the theoretical research is discussed and analyzed 
in relationship to concept of municipal co-financing. This is then followed (Chapter 3) by a 
presentation of the case study – namely the introduction of passenger train traffic on the 
Söderås Line. The next chapter (Chapter 4) presents the empirical analysis in this thesis. 
This is divided into two different parts. The first part (Part A) presents the outcomes from 
10 in-depth interviews with decision makers, politicians and officials. The questions are 
based on the previously introduced topics (in particular the theoretical discussion in 
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Chapter 2) to frame the interviews. Patterns emerging from the in-depth interviews have 
been taken into account and used to create an on-line questionnaire addressed to Sweden’s 
290 mayors. The results from these answers are presented in the second part of the 
empirical presentation (Part B). Finally, in the last chapter (Chapter 5) we discuss the 
outcomes from the empirical analysis as well as the conclusive points (10 in total) emerging 
from this thesis. 
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2. Theoretical foundation 
 This part discusses the theoretical concepts of Public-Private Partnership (PPP), and how 
it is related to municipal co-financing as a way to finance public projects. The discussion is 
introduced by explaining the concepts of welfare and socioeconomic efficiency of 
infrastructure investments. This in turn highlights the question of to what extent each agent 
is responsible for providing the infrastructure and connects to the theory of negotiating 
and bargaining power and consequently strives to bring us answers to the questions: Why is 
co-financing used? What problems does this financing technique create? And what 
problems does it solve? The theoretical answers and discussion in this chapter will frame 
the coming empirical analysis and presentation.  
2.1 Welfare and Kaldor-hicks efficiency 
 We start our discussion with the Kaldor-Hicks criterion which is a theory explaining how 
an allocative optimal situation is obtained.  It states that “a policy should be adapted if and 
only if those who will gain can fully compensate those who will lose and still be better of” 
(Boardman et al, 2014, p.32). According to the theory this ensures that resources are 
allocated in the best possible way. Consequently, that is why agents often strive towards 
such a situation. Yet, obtaining such a situation is not an easy quest. The high costs 
associated with the constructions hinder entrance of private agents. Hence, this situation is 
often referred to natural monopoly (cf. Boardman et al, 2014), as independent agents are 
not able to freely enter the market. Even so, infrastructure projects that are not financially 
viable could still be societally beneficial as it creates spillover effects to various branches of 
society (for instance the environment, the labor market etcetera). 
 The Swedish Parliament has sustained their position in the legislation, stating that it is 
vital to ensure “societal-economic efficiency and long-term sustainable transport system for 
the citizens and the economy” (prop.2005/06:160, VTI, 2007, s.11). 
  Nonetheless, ensuring socioeconomic efficiency is often a concept far from 
straightforward. Previous researches have noted that many projects and investments are 
surrounded with obstacles rendering such attempts hard in practice (for instance due to 
cost-overruns, time-overruns etcetera – cf. Flyvbjerg et al, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2009; Boardman 
et al, 2014). One method to investigate whether an infrastructure investment should be 
undertaken is to examine the net social benefit of the project, which in turn has to exceed 
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the net social costs in order for the investment to be socioeconomically efficient. This is 
done in the Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) framework. 
 Nonetheless, since infrastructure investments involves high costs and risks there has been 
several discussions on how to create incentives for the public sector to provide sufficient 
amounts of infrastructure. 
 State funding of large infrastructure investment projects does not always reflect that 
municipalities can have different objectives and goals. Therefore, a solution by the 
government has been to motivate municipal co-financing. It is promoted by the fact that if 
state and municipalities can co-ordinate its provision of infrastructure, it can provide 
substantial benefits for the municipality such as increased attractiveness for new businesses 
to start operating, exploitation of estate areas and increased municipal population which 
generates tax income (SKL, 2008, p.7). The concept of municipal co-financing is still 
unexplored in academic literature, and therefore we have used the concept of Public-Public 
Partnership to take the academic view of the matter into concern. In order to apply the 
relationship between the state and the municipalities into the PPP context, we refer to the 
relationship as State-Municipal Partnership. This means that the state and municipality co-
operate to fund different investments (as such projects might benefit both partners).  
2.2 Public Private Partnership 
 Infrastructure investments are scarce; as new investments require vast cost and the 
existing ones needs continuing maintenance. This problem has resulted in the need for 
alternative solutions to finance infrastructure projects. Consequently, there has been an 
increased interest of the Swedish Government to turn towards the municipalities to assist 
funding (SOU, 2011, p.12).  
 Municipal co-financing resembles to what we refer to is known as Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) (SOU 2011, p.12). The main difference is that the state is working with 
the municipality; and not a private agent.  
 Furthermore, PPP is long-term agreements of different types of investments that are 
conducted by government agents and private sector agents. Some investments benefit both 
agents. This increases the incentives to find such agreements.  
  Looking at the concept of PPP in relation to municipal co-financing one key argument is 
that some investments are beneficial on local level and would not have been initiated if one 
were to examine the project from state level. This means that municipal co-financing stance 
from the incentive of the municipalities (cf. OECD, 2014; Regeringen 1, 2012). 
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Additionally, it is assumed that such agreements could create greater risk sharing among the 
agents. This means that a more efficient way of dividing responsibilities, between the 
municipalities and the state, is created (Cars et al, 2011). This will be further discussed in 
section 2.2.2 when we introduce the concept of State-Municipal Partnership. 
 PPP agreements can take different shapes, depending on the responsibilities of each 
agent. We are presenting three of the main types of PPP agreement. These different 
models, allow different degrees of private responsibility of the projects as well as different 
level of implicit bargaining power; 
 
Design Build Arrangements (DB): The private sector takes on the construction risk and is 
responsible for the design and building of the project 
given the guidelines of the public sector. However, 
after the completion of the project the risk is taken 
over by the public sector, as they are now responsible 
for the operational aspects and maintenance of the 
infrastructure.   
 
Design -Build - Operate - Maintain (DBOM): The private sector is now facing both the construction risk as 
well as the operational and maintenance risks. 
 
Design - Build - Finance- Operate (DBFO):  By adding the financial aspect the private sector is also 
affected by the financial risk. Now the project involves 
the designing, building, financing of the project 
according to an agreement where the project will be 
handed back to the public sector by the end of the 
agreement. The contracts are usually long term 
(between 20-30 years) and have detailed outlines of 
payment and service standards. 
      
Auditor General British Colombia (2011); Grimsey and Lewis (2004) 
2.2.1 Characteristics of PPP 
   
 Still, even though projects come in different shapes, there are some key characteristics 
that identify PPP-agreement.  Some main characteristics are presented by Grimsey and 
Lewis (2004) and these include: 
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Type:  Some partnerships are predominately economic whilst others take 
welfare and socioeconomic benefits into account. In terms of 
infrastructure being a high-cost investment, it involves long term 
contracts where the aim to increase welfare. 
 
Focus on services:   This characteristic highlights services received by government. 
Subsequently, this means that government pays for the services that are 
provided by the private party, which then are delivered through the 
rented infrastructure.  
 
Whole-of-life cycle costing:  An important characteristic is that PPP contracts allow for complete 
integration, from design and operational costs to maintenance costs. This 
becomes especially important in infrastructure projects as those projects 
are usually long term, involving thorough planning and account for great 
costs. It is argued that having a PPP contract can therefore reduce the 
whole life cost of the project. 
 
Innovation:   Since PPP involves several parties, this gives greater opportunities for 
innovative solutions.  
 
Risk allocation:   Infrastructure investments involve a lot of costs in terms of operating 
and owning, where the costs can be difficult to measure. Therefore 
transferring the risk to a private party can lower the cost burden on the 
government.  
       Grimsey and Lewis (2004) 
  
 Combining the abovementioned characteristics highlights the main idea of PPP-
arrangements, being that risks are allocated between the different agents to generate greater 
efficiency and benefits throughout the entire life cycle of a project. Thereby, the different 
agents can invest away the risks by providing the changes that are needed locally (Adhazi 
and Bowles, 2001). Subsequently, these characteristics of PPP provide some explanation 
for the rationale to co-finance.   
2.2.2. State-Municipal Partnership 
 
 The above reasoning (section 2.2 and 2.2.1) presented the main theory behind Public-
Private Partnerships, which can be extended further to represent a State-Municipality 
Partnership and discuss the rationales explaining why municipalities co-finance and further 
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evaluate the costs and benefits of the concept. The reasoning should be linked to the 
aforementioned characteristics of a partnership, as it also sets the requirements for the 
contract. In terms of a contract between the state and municipality, both aim towards a 
rational use of their resources. They are both striving towards an effective resource 
allocation (taking the societal consequences in the region where they act into account).  
 According to Hart and Moore (1988) the function of a long-term contract is to facilitate 
trade between two parties with the aim to make relationship-specific investments. 
However, the authors also highlight the problem that contracts usually are done ex post. 
This means that when drafting the contract; it is hard to anticipate all costs that may arise 
during the whole project (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2009).  
  During a railway project there might be additional costs that are not accounted for 
initially such as new pavements connecting to the passenger railway, signaling systems, 
parking lots, soil conditions that hinder the construction (or prolong it etc.). In order to 
face these unexpected contingencies, this discussion evolves into the bargaining position of 
the agents: who is responsible for paying the additional costs? Does the burden fall on the 
state or municipality? 
 In the PPP process, Adhazi and Bowles (2004) have identified the negotiation phase to be 
the critical stage. They argue that 85% of the PPP projects run over time because of 
inefficiencies in the initial contracting procedure, which then result in cost over-runs 
(Adhazi and Bowles, 2001).  Additionally, the increase in costs is further emphasized by 
Grimsey and Lewis (2004), who argues that if the government solely is to be responsible 
for the design and construction – then there are greater risks of time and cost overruns. 
This is due to the attitudes of the governments which sometimes are less considerate about 
the local infrastructure projects.  
 Studies have shown that cost overruns of around 50-100 percent (in fixed prices) are 
common and that project forecasts are over optimized by 20-70 percent compared with 
actual developments (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). Consequently it is argued that the 
complexity of the contacts is a great disadvantage of the PPP projects, which also becomes 
prevalent in the State-Municipality Partnership. In order to fully evaluate the arguments 
behind, one needs to consider the importance of the bargaining positions of the agents 
involved. 
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2.3 Bargaining theory 
 As alluded to earlier, the ex post characteristic of railway projects can lead to 
unanticipated costs and the question regarding which agent is accountable for paying 
becomes a bargaining issue. This issue is settled in the contract. The agreed terms in the 
contract are vital especially in large scale projects, like railway infrastructure, as they are 
conducted on long terms. The risks of cost overruns are increasing if not all partners have 
agreed on all the terms.  
2.3.1 Hold-up problem 
 
 Subsequently, the long-term settlement of infrastructure projects can create a hold-up 
problem in infrastructure. This can occur since the investment creates a lock in for the 
investor, as the investment cannot be redeployed to another user or for another use 
(Sawant, 2008). For example, if agent A has made their required investments and agent B 
decides to change the terms of the agreement. This could result to unequal bargaining 
position for the agent A, as his/her investments cannot be redeployed. Hence, agent B is 
susceptible to hold-up agent A. 
2.3.2 Bargaining with asymmetric information - 
State/Municipality 
 
 As presented above, the arrangement of the PPP include different levels of private risk 
taking. These are crucial when evaluating the socioeconomic benefits. PPP can be seen as a 
way to pre-finance of the project by monetizing future costs/revenues.  
 In the case of State-Municipal co-financing agreements, this means that the debt is 
transferred from the state to the municipality. This sets the agents into different bargaining 
positions (Dehornoy, 2012, p.4). Subsequently, the different incentives and information 
between all agents makes it important to thoroughly evaluate the contract. In order to 
achieve this, a cost perspective can be used to evaluate the motives of the municipality and 
state.  
 Studies (cf. Riksrevisionen, 2012:21) show that municipalities have a rather cost driven 
approach since their objective is to have a good railway with for instance additives for noise 
reduction and environmental aspects – these aspects are important and affect the 
inhabitants of the municipalities.  Consequently, the interests of the municipalities might 
lead to higher costs than those initially calculated for (in the state cost-benefit analysis). 
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This shows the importance to include all terms in the contract (Riksrevisionen, 2012:21, 
p.54).  
 These types of agreements result in a bargaining situation where the agents have 
asymmetric information. The municipalities know the need for their infrastructure and how 
the local society would benefit from an improved railway. On the other hand, the state 
produces cost-benefit estimations on nation-wide basis and they make their decision on 
those results. They use this this information to decide if a project is socioeconomically 
beneficial and should be invested in, and they do not account for additional costs. This 
means that the agents are holding on to different information. This type of information 
asymmetry can give rise to different incentives amongst the agents.  
 Several theories highlight that if the costs are not fully taken into account and negotiated 
there are great risks of cost over-runs. Additionally, the Nash bargaining model discusses 
what is referred to as “threat points” (or constraints), which are the outside options for 
each participants. That said, different agents might have different outside option, which in 
turn could influence their bargaining position (cf. Chiu and Yang, 1998) 
2.3.3 Optimism bias/self-serving bias 
 
 The aforementioned discussion regarding costs deviating from the original calculations 
have been a highly scrutinized topic for a long time. Several authors have tried to find an 
explanation. As was concluded above (section 2.2.2), it is the negotiation phase that is the 
critical point to overcome cost decays. Additionally, Flyvberg (2006) points out two main 
drivers for cost over-runs: optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Optimism bias is 
related to positive beliefs about the future of the project. It might the case that 
municipalities ignore information that is not favoring their interest and they do not 
consider rational weighing of gains and losses (Boardman et al, 2014). Strategic 
misrepresentation on the other hand is a more deliberate action to underestimate costs and 
overestimate the benefits of a project in order to get the project through (Flyvbjerg, 
2006).  Subsequently, both can be seen as deceptions, where the first is self-deception but 
where the latter is intentional. The effect is however argued to be the same, resulting in less 
accurate forecasts and deviating cost-benefit ratios.  Incorrectly specified calculations can in 
turn result in that “faulty” projects are conducted that actually are not socioeconomically 
beneficial. Subsequently, it becomes a question of who has the greatest power to pursue 
and enhance the importance of a project. This in turn affects the bargaining situation and 
the way projects are ranked in relationship to other projects (Riksrevisionen, 2012:21; SKL, 
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2014). Studies have shown that 84% of rail passenger forecasts are wrong by more than 
+/- 20 percent and that 9 out of 10 rail projects have overestimated traffic (Flyvbjerg et al, 
2003).  
 Therefore, examining potential optimism bias and self-serving bias become very 
important when assessing who is responsible for the misinformation and how the costs will 
be accounted for – especially if the investment is co-financed (since the contract has to be 
well-defined to provide proper cost allocation, cf. section 2.2.2). 
2.4 Externalities and effects 
 When evaluating the benefits and costs from a railway investment it is important to 
consider the externalities of the investment. Externality is defined as an effect that 
production, or consumption, has on third party agents – agents that are not involved in the 
production or consumption of the good (Boardman, 2014).  
 In terms of positive externalities, a well-functioning railway solution will result in time 
savings when commuting. This applies to the theory of commuter’s non-linear response to 
time distances presented by Johansson et al (2003). The study highlights that the 
willingness of individuals to commute is highly dependent on the time distance which can 
be divided into intra-municipal (short time distances), intra-regional (medium time 
distances) and extra regional commuting (long time distance). Moreover a distinction is also 
made between preference for a job in the home region or home municipality. Given that 
individuals are utility maximizing, the study shows that those who have to commute long 
distances are the most time sensitive and that the greatest preference is to work in the 
home municipality (Johansson et al., 2003, p.316). This therefore highlights the importance 
of how efficient the railway system is in providing effective commuting and thereby 
provides socioeconomic benefits. Studies show that 10-15 minutes of commuting time is 
considered a short time distance whilst 50-60 minutes is considered as a commuting region 
and perceived as a long time distance (Johansson et. al.2003). Lower commuting time gives 
employers a greater area with potential workers, and it gives prospective employees access 
to a larger area with potential work-places. Other positive externalities could for instance 
include environmental aspects that occur from an investment in railway infrastructure (cf. 
SOU, 2011). On the other hand, a negative externality could occur for third-party 
individuals in the city due to, for instance, increased noise levels, following the introduction 
of train-traffic.   
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3. Municipal co-financing of  the   
Söderås Line 
  The Swedish railway system has been under constant development ever since the train 
was first introduced in the 19th century. Today, the Swedish Transport Administration is 
responsible for long-term planning of the railway system and its maintenance (Trafikverket 
2, 2014). The Swedish Transport Administration is a government agency, and its activities 
are ultimately decided by the Swedish Parliament. The latest National Transport Plan was 
approved the 8th of April 2014. It emphasizes on the role of the railway system to create 
work opportunities and states that that “(...) with a well-functioning transport system both 
work and growth is benefitting” (Regeringen 2, 2014, p.1). According to this view, the 
transport system is seen as a way to bring regions closer and increase opportunities for 
both employees and employers.  
 Apart from the positive spillover 
effects that might be created for the 
labor market following large 
infrastructural investments, several 
additional benefits could emerge 
from a well-functioning, and 
developed, railway system.   
   On the left side, the current rail 
lines across the eastern part of the 
Region of Scania is depicted – with 
the so called Freight line of Scania 
marked in red. The Freight line of 
Scania runs from Ängelholm in 
northern Scania and connects with the Lomma Line and the Marieholms Line. The railway 
line which is analyzed in this essay is a part of this greater line. It is the line running from 
Åstorp to Teckomatorp and it is known as the Söderås Line. The Söderås Line is currently 
trafficked by freight trains, and passenger trains are expected to be introduced between 
Malmö and Åstorp in 2020 (Trafikverket 1, 2014; Appendix 1, 2014). 
   The decision, and the nature of co-financing, to introduce passenger trains was agreed 
upon and signed by the Municipality of Svalöv, the Municipality of Bjuv, the Municipality 
Fig. 1: Railway lines in western Scania 
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of Lomma, the Municipality of Kävlinge, the Swedish Transport Administration and the 
Region of Scania. This agreement covers both the Söderås Line and the Lomma Line (as 
aforementioned, both belonging to the greater Freight line of Scania). Put differently, these 
different agents are co-financing the introduction of passenger trains along the Söderås 
Line (and the Lomma Line). 
    This process of developing the Söderås Line (as well as the Lomma line) is conducted in 
three different stages (Trafikverket 1, 2014). The first stage involves the creation of the 
Freight Line, which runs through the region of Scania (see depiction: fig. 2). In the next two 
stages the capacity of freight trains is increased and it involves the initiation passenger trains. 
Currently only four freight trains can pass per day and there is a need of more passenger 
platforms (in Municipality of Svalöv two new platform will be built, in Kågeröd and in 
Svalöv). New platforms and further development of existing once is needed in in 
Billesholm, Kågeröd, Svalöv and Teckomatorp (Appendix 1, 2014; Trafikverket 2, 2014). 
 Subsequently, the need to reconstruct the current railway is made in order to meet the 
requirements of increased railway traffic (Banverket et al, 2009). The need for the 
reconstruction is also done in order to make the Freight Line though Scania more effective 
(as it allows full utilization of the benefits from the Hallandsås tunnel). Subsequently, it is 
also expected that commuting will increase, where a travel prognosis has been conducted 
by Skånetrafiken who estimate that the number of commuters along the Söderås Line in 
Svalöv municipality will increase from today’s value 1260 to 1600 in 2020 (Skånetrafiken, 
Appendix 5, Mats Améen, 2014-05-06). Thus, there can be argued to be positive 
externalities with respect to the environment by people using the train instead of car or 
bus. A further argument supporting an incentive to commute is the benefit of a cut in 
travel time when taking the train, where Skånetrafiken estimates that it will take 35 minutes 
from Svalöv to Malmö using the Söderås Line, compared to the current 60 minutes. 
 An outdated report done by Trivector (2000) for Söderås Line show that the time 
distance between Kågeröd and Teckomatorp was going to be 11 minutes (with the X10-
trains) compared with to the other public transport option at the time – which was a 23 
minutes bus-ride. Even though this figure is outdated, it still shows the saved commuting 
times following introduction of passenger train traffic (as discussed in Chapter 2).  
 The very same study (from Trivector, 2000) shows also that if the train is only going to 
depart once an hour - then the bus is a better option for public transport. The report states 
that “financially, no alternative is better than to today’s bus-routes” (Trivector 2000, p.17). 
Also, according to a cost-benefit analysis conducted by in 2009, the project is not 
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socioeconomically beneficial. The costs are estimated to be greater than the benefits by 
116,4 billion SEK and the net present value is -0.6 (Banverket et al, 2009). Nevertheless, it 
is argued that the decreased burden on Markarydline is a positive effect which is a not 
possible to price and take into account in the cost-benefit analysis.  
 Other positive non-priced effects that are not considered in the analysis is the benefits of 
long term sustainable transport support in terms of decreased emission due to more freight 
transportation compared to large truck transportation (Banverket et al, 2009).  In order to 
provide a clear view of the whole process of the initiation of Söderås Line, a timeline is 
presented below; 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Time-line, passenger traffic on the Söderås Line 
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Fig. 3: Agents 
3.1 Agents 
Distinguishing between the different agents involved financing the Söderås Line requires 
a separation to be made between the different agents and their place in the administrative 
division of Sweden.  
The left side illustration shows 
these agents and their relation to 
the introduction of passenger 
trains on the Söderås Line (and the 
Lomma Line). The main agent in 
this depiction is the Swedish 
Transport Administration, the 
region of Scania, Svalöv 
Municipality and the other 
municipalities that are co-financing 
the introduction of passenger trains Söderås Line.  
 The Swedish Transport Administration acts upon decisions from the Swedish 
Government and is state funded.  The municipalities of Sweden collect taxes from local 
residents, while the Region of Scania is acting on behalf of the county of Scania and their 
investments in infrastructural projects are state funded (cf. SKL, 2011). 
3.1.1 The Swedish Transport Administration 
     
 The Swedish Transport Administration is acting on behalf of the Swedish Government. 
Consequently, the investments in the railway system are decided through the national 
budget (Regeringen 2, 2014). One goal for Swedish Transport Administration, highlighted 
in the proposition 2008/09:35, is that they should sustain socioeconomic efficiency in their 
long-term transport investments.  This goal should be reflected in the National Transport 
Plan and ought to be followed accordingly. According to the proposition (2008/09:35), the 
Swedish Transport Administration has the responsibility to evaluate models, which might 
result in more effective infrastructure investments (Regeringen 4, 2008; Regeringen 5, 
2008). 
    Furthermore, co-financing can be divided into municipal, commercial grant, EU 
support, user-fees (infrastructure charge, road toll and congestion tax) (cf. SKL, 2011; 
Mellin et al, 2012).   
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 In terms of financing infrastructure investments the main investment rule is that the 
governments should be responsible for all cost according to the budget law (2011:203) 
(Riksrevisionen, 2012). However, in order to meet the goals of socioeconomically efficient 
infrastructure investments, there has been increased interest for cost-sharing.   The idea of 
co-financing has contributed to the legislation DS 2008:11, which enables co-financing by 
municipalities of regional infrastructure projects (Banverket et al, 2008). Further legislative 
changes in order to enhance co-financing include allowing municipalities to present the co-
financing of public infrastructure on their balance sheet (SFS 1997:614) (Cars et al, 2011). 
 The Swedish Government decided to allocate SEK 417 billion for the National Transport 
Plan 2010-2021 (SOU, 2011). The cost of the projects that were co-financed added up to 
SEK 128 billion, and these state were funded to 48 %. Approximately, SEK 19 billion were 
municipal co-financed (which were primarily funded by municipal taxation) (SOU 2011:12, 
p.41-42). 
  A governmental decision from 2012 frames the directives for the present infrastructure 
plan (Trafikverket 4, 2014) (Regeringen 3, 2012). Accordingly, the Swedish Transport 
Administration should follow these sets of guidelines (Regeringen 3, 2012, 11-13):  
 
 The initiation of a infrastructure project should be based on the transport-political goals (which 
requires that, as a main rule, projects should be socioeconomically beneficial and that co-
financing will not enable municipalities to “pay” to have their projects prioritized”) 
 The share of main responsibility in terms of state and municipality should not be 
changed           
 All co-financing should voluntary             
  The initiative to co-finance should be based on the utility of the contributor.           
 Co-financing should mainly consider improvements or add-ons to projects, which the Swedish 
Transport Association already is considering to conduct.           
 If the project is co-financed from its initial state, it has to be thoroughly motivated 
 The Swedish Transport Administration has to present expected benefits of the co-financiers, as 
a part of the complete assessment. Particular attention should be paid to this presentation if the 
co-financing refers to initial projects or if the expected benefits of co-financiers are greater than 
what the Swedish Transport Administration anticipated (e.g. with regard to the exploitation 
values). 
Regeringen 3, 2012, p. 12 
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 Noticeable is, according to these abovementioned requirements, that the co-financing 
should only be used if there is a need for such investments and if there is a desire to 
participate in co-financing. 
  Yet again, a proposition (approved by the parliament in 2012), considering investments 
for a strong and sustainable infrastructure system (Regeringen 1, 2012), states that the 
financing should mainly be the government responsibility. It also states that if “a state 
funded investments to some extension is to be considered primarily a municipal matter; 
then it might be reasonable that municipal taxpayers contribute to the investment” 
(Regeringen 1, 2012, p.52). This means that municipal co-financing should be based on the 
municipal utility of the investment (Regeringen 4, 2012). 
 The 8 of April 2014 the Swedish government presented a new national transport plan for 
2014-2025 (Regeringen 2, 2014; Trafikverket 4, 2014). This plan explains of how the state 
funded investments adding up to SEK 522 billion (of which SEK 86 billion in railway 
infrastructure) should be distributed among the infrastructure projects.1 
3.1.2     Region Scania/Skånetrafiken 
 
 Investments from the Region of Scania are depending on the regional transport 
infrastructure plan (RTI-Plan, 2014-2025). The most recent one is covering the period 
2014-2025. The infrastructure investments that Region Scania depends on the state funds 
allocated to the region. In the present RTI-plan these funds added up to SEK 4356 million. 
SEK 500 million of these are used to co-finance projects in the National Transport Plan 
(RTI Skåne, 2014-2025). The division of financial responsibilities between the State, Region 
Scania and municipalities are clearly stated in the RTI-plan 2014-2025 in the following way: 
 
 
 For new railway stations: 
New railway stations including commuting- and bicycle parking, bus stops, additional 
attached roads to the station should be financed by the municipality. This is a “ticket” for the 
municipality to be part of the railway system. 
 
 
                                                        
1 In the process of writing this thesis, 2014-05-22, it became apparent in the news that the Swedish Transport 
Administration has provided faulty calculations with respect to the 522 billion in the national transport plan 
for 2014-2025. Internal documents show that around 20 billion is missing for the provision of railway 
construction (SVT, 2014).  This is something that might have great cost consequences for the projects in the 
Swedish national transport plan, such as Söderås Line. 
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  For reconstruction of stations: 
Railway line reconstruction such as weather protection and station extensions should 
normally be financed by Swedish Transport Administration/Region Scania. 
Surroundings such as commuting- and bicycle parking, bus stops, additional attached 
roads to the station should be financed 50% by the municipality and 50% by the state, 
usually by financials provided for the RTI-plan. In case of constructions based solely 
on the interest of the municipalities, then it should be fully financed by the 
municipality. 
 
 For reconstruction regarding increased capacity  and standard improvements: 
Swedish Transport Administration /Region Scania finances capacity measures and 
standard improvements. Municipal co-financing could be suggested if there are great 
local benefits. 
 
RTI-Skåne (2014-2025) 
 
  Abovementioned requirements are also presented in the Söderås Line contract, where the 
financial responsibilities are stated and discussed (Trafikverket 1, 2014; Appendix 1).   
 The RTI-plan of 2014-2024 also highlights that the decision of transport alternatives 
varies with distance. The train usage increases with travel distance (RTI 2014-2025, 2014). 
The plan shows that one third of the residents use the train if the travel distance is longer 
than 50 km. As for the Söderås Line, enabling passenger traffic would increase possibilities 
for local residents to travel to the larger cities in Scania (namely, Lund, Malmö and 
Helsingborg). That is, improvements in railway infrastructure bring the region closer and 
this is one fundamental reason for the infrastructure investments of the Region of Scania. 
It is assumed that this will have a positive effect on the productivity (cf. RTI, 2014-2025). 
The RTI-plan (2014-2024) also links to a study conducted by OECD showing that the 
population in the county is expected to increase by 100 000 in 2020, thus requiring a 
further developed labor market which is supposedly benefitting from a more developed 
infrastructure.   
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3.1.3    Municipality - Svalöv 
  
 As stated in the introductory part of this thesis (Chapter 1), citizens2 and politicians of the 
municipality has long demanded the introduction of passenger trains along the Söderås 
Line. Important to note is that passenger trains used to traffic this route (until 1991). To 
investigate whether passenger trains should be introduced in Svalöv a pre-study was 
conducted in 1995 (Trivector, 1995). In 1997 an agreement was signed stating that 
passenger trains should be introduced along the route (Appendix 2). This agreement was 
then followed by an additional pre-study by the Swedish Rail Administration (1999, todays 
Swedish Transport Administration). It emphasizes the possibilities for introduction of 
passenger trains through Svalöv and Kågeröd.  
 Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that the co-financing was neither discussed in 
these report; nor in the agreement of intention that was signed in 1997. Noticeable is that a 
later report from 2000 (Trivector, 2000) concluded that no alternative way of public 
transport, to the ones investigated with passenger trains going through Kågeröd and 
Svalöv, was economically viable in comparison with the bus lines (Trivector, 2000: 17). 
Still, it is important to point out that this report does not take all socioeconomic aspects 
into account. Therefore, it is not possible to rule out the train as the most favorable 
alternative (when examining the report from Trivector, 2000). Despite previous studies and 
negotiations, Söderås Line was not part of the national transport plan in 2010-2021 since 
the Swedish Rail Administration, todays Swedish Transport Administration, never signed 
the contract. Subsequently, the decision to introduce passenger trains was not signed and 
finalized until 2014. Given this long process to finally get Söderås Line in the national 
transport plan 2014-2025, makes it interesting to further look into the terms of the 
contract. 
 
 
                                                        
2 With respect to the long-term development of the Söderås Line rail. As we were looking though the 
archives in the town hall (2014-05-07), one letter from a resident caught our eye. The letter is from 1995. It 
contains detailed descriptions of the readers view on the matter. Claiming that it is doubtful whether our 
environment can handle more car and bus traffic. The letter continues “At the same time you let the rail way 
decay (...)” “is this economics?” (Letter from a resident of Svalöv, addressed to the Swedish Prime Minister, 
1995) 
 
25 
 3.2 Contract regarding co-financing Söderås Line 
 The contract of co-financing (considering the Söderås Line and the Lomma Line) 
describes how the responsibilities ought to be divided among the financiers. The project is 
conducted in three steps; Step 1 includes the reconstruction of the freight line in order to 
increase the freight traffic. Step 2 and 3 are needed in order to increase the capacity of 
trains, which will include additional constructions such as stations to enable passenger 
trains (Appendix 1; Trafikverket 1, 2014). 
 
Agent Amount Step 1 Step 2 
The Swedish Transport Association, of which 440 440 0 
- National level 188 188 0 
- Regional level (Region Scania) 252 252 0 
Bjuv municipality 34 0 34 
Svalöv municipality 93 0 93 
Kävlinge municipality 30 0 30 
Lomma 43 0 43 
Total 640 440 200 
Table 1: Cost division between the different agents (Trafikverket 2, 2014) 
  
 The contract of co-financing (table 2) shows that the costs of introducing passenger trains 
on the Söderås Line and the Lomma Line adds up to an estimated total amount of 640 
million SEK (2014) (Appendix 1; Trafikverket 1, 2014). According to the contract, the 
municipalities are financing the construction of train stations as well as the connecting local 
infrastructural needs, such as parking spaces, bicycle stands and connecting pavements. 
The table also highlights that Svalöv is contributing with SEK 93 million, being the greatest 
amount when comparing the municipalities. This is mainly because they will have to 
undertake the construction of two stations (in both Kågeröd and Svalöv). The applicable 
project construction in line with the PPP model (discussed in Chapter 2) would be the 
Design - Build - Finance - Operate (DBFO).  In terms of Designing, Building and 
Operating, a contract has been conducted with Strukton Rail. The financing will be shared 
by Region Skåne, Trafikverket and the affected municipalities. This PPP combination of 
Söderås Line can be combined with the partnership characteristics outlined in the theory 
part: The type of Söderås Line is shared responsibility of the services of the constructional 
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part and financing, which allows for better allocation of resources in terms of having an 
experienced entrepreneur operating the project 
 Moreover, according to the contract, changes in costs from what is stated in the National 
Transport Plan and the Regional Transport Plan should be divided between the 
participants. It also states that if the costs were to increase with more than 10 % at the time 
of procurement of construction; then each participant is allowed to re-negotiate the 
contract (§7, Trafikverket 1, 2014). The contact also states that all additional costs that arise 
due to the will of a unilateral partner, should be covered by the partner to 100 % (§7, 
Trafikverket 1, 2014).  
 When comparing the contracts from the two time periods (the agreement of intention in 
1997 and the current 2014), it becomes evident that having co-financing in the current 
National Transport Plan played an important part, which will be further developed, in the 
empirical case study. 
3.3 Operationalization of the theory on the case of the 
Söderås Line 
 Following the previous discussion, regarding the main agents of the project, it is 
important to note that the process of introducing passenger train on the Söderås Line has 
been developed in different stages, with initial discussions going back to the early 90s. 
Therefore it has becomes really interesting to investigate the negotiation process since the 
initiation of Söderås Line.  
 Subsequently, the process highlights the rationales of the decision, and reasons behind the 
investment; why to co-finance the Söderås Line? What problems does co-financing create 
and solve? The theoretical part in section 2 has provided a thorough explanation of the 
rationale behind co-financing with the expected benefits of risk sharing and increased 
investment in infrastructure projects with respect to incentives and benefits on local 
municipal level. In terms of costs, it becomes the responsibility of the municipalities to co-
finance in order to get a project in the national plan. Therefore the municipalities are faced 
with the financial burden.   Subsequently, the next section will provide an empirical study 
of how co-financing is perceived by Svalöv municipality. Finally, in order to thoroughly 
address the rationale behind co-financing, the last section provides the views of all the 290 
Swedish municipalities. Conclusively, these studies will enable a case study evaluation to the 
questions; why municipal co-financing and what are the perceived costs and benefits?   
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4. Empirical Analysis 
Part A: Interviews 
4.1 Method 
    To understand the economic rationale of the decision for the municipality of Svalöv to 
co-finance the Söderås Line a total of 10 in-depth interviews have been conducted. These 
interviews follow a script, with open-ended questions, to cover the previously introduced 
topics (section 2 and 3). Each question has been formalized in such a way that they 
operationalize the theory we have previously introduced. All interviews were conducted 
semi-structured, with the explicit purpose to understand the different agents and their view 
of the concept of co-financing, and in particular in relationship to the project of the 
Söderås Line.   
 Quinn (1990) discusses what is referred to as the general interview guide approach, which 
has been used in these interview set-ups. The topics covered have been pre-determined in 
advance, and some questions have been added depending on the position of the 
interviewed participant. Furthermore, some questions have been altered to more clearly 
address the respondent. This form of interview technique allows for follow up questions, 
which was often needed to make clarifications. The interviews took between 45 minutes to 
1 hour and 30 minutes to conduct. Most of them were carried out in person, but two 
interviews were conducted via telephone.  
4.2 Respondents 
 Naturally, as noted earlier in Chapter 1 and 3, the main agent of interest in this analysis is 
the Municipality of Svalöv – as it is from their perspective we base our research. To 
understand the behavior of the municipality, and the underlying rationale behind the 
decision to co-finance the Söderås Line, we have interviewed respondents primarily on the 
basis of their position in Svalöv and their role in the introduction of passenger trains on the 
Söderås Line. Moreover, to understand the relationship between Svalöv and the other 
agents in the project, additional interviews have been conducted with representatives from 
the Swedish Transport Administration and Skånetrafiken (the public transport operator in 
the Region of Scania). The politicians, the officials and the decision makers we have 
interviewed, and their role in the organization can be viewed below, 
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  As aforementioned, the interviews are based upon pre-defined questions and the 
participants are selected on the basis of their role in the organization. Following a semi-
structured interview form gave us the opportunity to explore various views regarding the 
decision to implement passenger trains on the Söderås Line and determine patterns in our 
answers.  
   Nonetheless, it is important, once again, to highlight that negotiations regarding the 
introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line have been carried out since the 90s. It 
was been a long process. To understand the concept of municipal co-financing in relation 
to the Söderås Line we must understand this entire process - going back to the mid-90s and 
the agreement of intention in 1997 (cf. Chapter 3). We have therefore decided to interview 
Karl-Erik Kruse, answering on behalf of himself. Karl-Erik Kruse is the previous mayor of 
the municipality (succeeded by the current mayor Birgitta Jönsson). All other respondents 
have been working on the project in the finalizing stage (during the time of signing). 
4.3 Structure of the analysis 
 In this section we use the theoretical presentation in chapter 2 – to capture the essence of 
the interviews. The questionnaire, which the interviews were based upon, is built upon this 
theoretical foundation. Do note that this study is aiming at finding different patterns and to 
NAME ORGANIZATION ROLE DATE 
KARL-ERIK KRUSE ex- Municipality of Svalöv Former chairman of the 
municipal board and municipal 
commissioner 
2014-05-07 
BIRGITTA JÖNSSON Municipality of Svalöv Chairman of the municipal board 
and municipal commissioner 
2014-05-07 
JAN BENGTSSON Municipality of Svalöv Financial Manager 2014-05-07 
MATS DAHLBERG Municipality of Svalöv Head of planning and community 
planing 
2014-05-07 
MICHAEL 
ANDERSSON 
Municipality of Svalöv  2014-04-10 
MATS AMÉEN Skånetrafiken Chief Strategy Officer 2014-05-05 
CECILIA 
MÅRTENSSON 
Swedish Association of 
Local Authorities and 
Regions 
Administrative Officer 2014-04-25 
JACK BÅRSTRÖM Swedish Transport 
Administration 
Urban and regional planner 2014-05-13 
FREDRIK LÖFQVIST Municipality of Svalöv  Head of local government 2014-05-21 
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uncover the different agents’ motives and argumentation. A limitation of such an approach 
is that the respondents’ answers are depending on their knowledge and their memory (cf. 
Quinn, 1990). At the same time, this approach enables us to cover topics and discussions 
that are not written down in documents and policy papers. It allows us to direct the 
question of the rationale of municipal co-financing to the officials, and the decision makers 
(to those individuals who led the work of finalizing the agreement of co-financing). In this 
presentation of the interviews we focus on these main topics: Economic Rationale, 
Negotiations, Risk sharing, Externalities and effects and Alternative opportunities. 
4.3.1 Economic rationale 
 
 Important to note is that the partners that signed the co-financing agreement is all striving 
towards a rational allocation of their resources (cf. Chapter 2). That is, they all ought to 
distribute their own resources in the best way possible. Since the objectives for the agents 
differ – so does the expected benefits emerging from the investment.  
   During our interviews several different positive effects following the introduction of 
passenger trains, on the Söderås Line, was presented. In particular, increased attractiveness 
was highlighted by the participants representing the municipality of Svalöv. Jan Bengtsson 
(2014-05-07), financial manager, stated that the introduction of passenger trains on the 
Söderås Line is “a way to put Svalöv on the map”, which highlights the argument of 
increased attractiveness following the introduction of passenger trains. During our 
interviews many respondents argued that higher attractiveness could lead to an increase in 
the number of citizens in the municipality (as more individuals decide to move to the 
municipality of Svalöv). Additionally, many of the respondents argued that the investment 
might have positive effects on the labor market. The region becomes closer and more job 
alternatives appear for the citizens. Employees are given access to a larger area with 
prospective workers (more applicants see Svalöv as an option of occupancy, mainly as one 
can travel to the municipality faster). At the same time, workers are given access to more 
work places, as the entire Scania region becomes closer. Additional societally endeavoured 
reasons, presented by the respondents, that motivate municipal co-financing was recreation 
and comfort.  
 Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21) pointed out that this investment shows a belief in the 
future, meaning that the investment can have positive spill-over effects to future 
generation. A final incentive for the investment was the environment, as trains have less 
effect on the environment.    
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   Nonetheless, a tendency among the respondents was to emphasize on the benefits. This 
was in particular the case during our interviews with representatives from the municipality 
of Svalöv. Whether the, abovementioned, positive effects would actually occur was less 
certain. Mats Améen (2014-05-05), chief strategy officer at Skånetrafiken, argued that the 
“structure of commuting is viscous” and that it takes time before new commuting 
structures appear in practice (he estimated that it might take 5-10 years until we can 
observed differences in commuting patterns among local residents). 
   Additionally, the respondents representing the municipality of Svalöv tended to direct 
critique towards municipal co-financing as a way of financing. Mats Dahlberg (2014-05-07), 
environment manager, argued that “municipalities have to pay too much” and that co-
financing is not optimal for the municipality. This was also noted by the former mayor of 
Svalöv, Karl-Erik Kruse (2014-05-07), who argued that residents of municipalities that 
participate in municipal co-financing are “faced with a double burden”. They are paying for 
infrastructural improvements both via the municipal tax and via the state tax. 
   Still, we observed that few reports have been made regarding the socioeconomic effects 
of the construction of the Söderås Line for the municipality of Svalöv (and the Region of 
Scania). It was made clear by the Mats Améen, chief strategy officer at Skånetrafiken, that: 
“if Skånetrafiken would be a profit maximizing company – then introduction of passenger 
train on would not be considered”. He stated that they are only expected to cover the cost 
by 30-40 % (from ticket sales and tax revenues). Even if the bus line along the Söderås 
Line is stopped, the calculations show less than 50 % cost coverage. 
   It became apparent (in our interviews) that the respondents are taking much more into 
consideration than just economic figures (even though no reports of local socioeconomic 
effects have been produced). 
4.3.1.1 Economic welfare and economic efficiency 
 
 Examining whether a project is socioeconomically desirable is hardly possible in practice. 
The respondents pointed out that it might be the case that the positive effects do not 
appear. The financial manager of Svalöv, Jan Bengtsson (2014-05-07) pointed out that he 
had not read the report examining the effects of the construction from 2009 (Banverket et 
al, 2009) and that he had not come across any calculations of expected effects following the 
introduction of passenger trains along the Söderås Line. He also argued that the expenses 
will be covered through an increased number of inhabitants or increased taxation. Yet 
again, no papers have been made that calculate the effects of implementing rail way traffic 
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– and no assessment of profitability have been conducted (that justify the project from 
municipality of Svalöv, taking socioeconomic effects into account). Instead some 
respondents referred to previous studies, some of which was conducted in the 90s, and 
other studies carried out by the Swedish Transport Administration. 
  Jan Bengtsson (2014-05-07), like others, noted that the positive effects might not occur. 
He stated that “it could be case that 3000 people move to the municipality – and perhaps 
that would make the decision financially beneficial. But, the politicians did not request any 
such calculations”. During our interviews it was also argued that even if people were to 
move to Svalöv, it does not necessarily mean that the municipality will gain in monetary 
terms (mainly in terms of increased taxes). This once again highlights that financial motives 
was not the driving force of the initiation of passenger train traffic on the Söderås Line. 
The decision was based on a “belief in the future” and the individual belief that the effects 
will occur (especially increased attractiveness) and a strong conviction. Jan Bengtsson 
(2014-05-07) stated that “people want it”. That is, the introduction of passenger trains is 
highly demanded by the citizens and the politicians– even if the positive effects are 
neglected. 
4.3.1.2 State-Municipal Partnership 
  
   Here we use the theory discussed in chapter 2, regarding State-Municipal Partnership, to 
uncover the mechanism underlying the decision for the agents to invest in the Söderås 
Line. Consequently, all respondents are striving towards making decisions that are socio-
economically beneficial – with an optimally designed public transport system. 
   In the case of the Söderås Line; it is obvious that the different agents have different, and 
sometimes even conflicting, reasons to co-finance the introduction of passenger trains. As 
stated earlier, in section 4.3.1, the financial gains of the decision to co-finance are 
negligible. That said, many more factors than the purely financial ones have to be taken 
into account (apart from cost coverage in terms of usage fees or ticket purchases). 
   Still, during our interviews we observed that many of the respondents lacked information 
regarding the effects and future projections (following the investment). Hence, this might 
go against the principle presented by the government, which highlights that projects should 
be evaluated and prioritized depending on their socioeconomic benefits (cf. Chapter 3). 
   Mats Dahlberg (2014-05-07), environment manager, noted that the problem with this 
type of agreement, e.g. state-municipal, is that the agreements are not striving towards cost-
effectiveness. He argued that the municipality was faced with a “accept the deal or the 
32 
project will not be carried out”-situation (Mats Dahlberg, 2014-05-07). He then argued that 
if the participants was co-operating throughout the entire planning and decision making 
process, then this would lead to more informed decisions (as both partners would benefit 
from such an co-operation). 
   Additionally, Mats Améen (2014-05-05) stated that few projects are able to fit into the 
National Transport Plan (which lists all coming large infrastructure projects, cf. Chapter 
3).  Subsequently, he highlights that “co-financing is not officially a requirement, but in 
practice, if the partners to Swedish Transport Administration want to see their 
infrastructural project realized and be part of the National Infrastructure Plan, the 
municipalities have to co-finance”.   
4.3.2 Risk sharing 
 
 When it comes to the risks associated with the project it is apparent that the signed 
contract emphasizes on how expected costs deviations ought to be distributed among the 
co-financiers; and this was pointed out by many of the respondents. Jack Bårström (2014-
05-13), urban and regional planner at the Swedish Transport Administration, pointed out 
that the contract states that if costs were to increase by more than 10 % at the time of 
procurement of construction, then the co-financiers stand free to renegotiate the contract 
(Trafikverket 1 §7, Appendix 1, Jack Bårström, 2014-05-13). 
   Another risk, or possibility, is that the Swedish government opt out from the contract. 
This has pointed out by Karl-Erik Kruse who argued that “the state can always retreat; but 
the municipalities are not able to do so” (Karl-Erik Kruse, 2014-05-07). He was referring to 
a section in the contract saying that the decision is binding under the condition that the 
Swedish Government (see: the Swedish Parliament) approves the measure and the 
financing in the coming, and future, national transport plans. The contract is also requiring 
that the regional council approves the measure in its plan for Regional Transport 
Infrastructure (RTI-plan, cf. Chapter 3). This means that Svalöv do not only face the risk 
of cost over-runs (as discussed by Flyvbjerg 2003, cf. Chapter 2) – but they also the risk of 
having the agreement revoked (for instance following a shift in the political landscape). 
   Furthermore, Jan Bengtsson (2014-05-07), financial manager, and Mats Dahlberg (2014-
05-07) pointed out that investigations in the municipality of Svalöv have shown 
environmental pollution. Jan Bengtsson (2014-05-07) said that they have to wait until this 
matter is investigated; and that it might result in the need to find an alternative location for 
the platforms in Svalöv. He then estimated that it would take approximately one year to 
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come up with a new detail plan (if they were forced to change the location of the train 
station). It was also pointed out that this would not necessarily require a new contract 
between the different co-financiers (as long as the new detail plan it is line with the 
contract). 
   Another risk pointed out, and discussed in section 4.3.1, was that the positive effects 
would not appear. Karl-Erik Kruse (2014-05-07), former mayor of Svalöv, argued that it is 
highly questionable if Svalöv are able to reclaim their expenditures. 
4.3.3 Externalities and effects 
 
 To investigate the consequences that will occur from passenger train traffic on the 
Söderås Line, we asked our respondents what effects they expect to see following the 
construction of the Söderås Line. This goes into the discussion regarding economic effects. 
A tendency among the participants was that they argued that the introduction of passenger 
trains on the Söderås Line would increase the attractiveness of the municipality. Hence, the 
population would increase. Mats Améen (2014-05-05), chief strategist at Skånetrafiken, 
argued that families might consider living in Svalöv following the introduction of passenger 
trains (as they would be able to live in smaller city with reasonable distance to working 
places).   
   Additionally, Michael Andersson (2014-04-10), administrative chief at Svalöv, pointed out 
that one effect that have been discussed was that the introduction of passenger trains 
would give the residents (and  the non-residents) access to recreation areas (in particular 
the Söderås  National Park). Another effect discussed, in particular by the mayor of Svalöv 
(Birgitta Jönsson, 2014-05-07), was that the introduction of passenger trains would result in 
less car use, as the public transport system would provide residents with easy-access to 
work places in other municipalities and more cultural opportunities (as it becomes easier to 
travel to other municipalities). 
   A negative effect of the introduction of the passenger trains that was presented in our 
interviews was that it might result in closed bus lines, and this would affect the residents 
living in remote areas of Svalöv. Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21), head of the municipality, 
pointed out that this is not certain, as the contract is not requiring such a development (cf. 
Trafikverket 1, 2014; Appendix 1). 
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4.3.4 Negotiations 
 
  The respondents from the municipality of Svalöv expressed a strong will to introduce 
passenger train traffic on the Söderås Line. Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21), head of local 
government, pointed out that “We [edi. rem. Svalöv] have been one of the driving forces in 
the negotiations and tried arrange some of the meetings. We tried to get all parties to agree 
when something was unclear”. This quotation shows the great degree of engagement for 
the Söderås Line from the Municipality of Svalöv. Mats Dahlberg (2014-05-07), 
environmental manager, pointed out that “we [edi. rem. Svalöv] have felt that it was 
important that all parts [edi. rem. all co-financiers] wanted to have traffic on the railway”. 
This was also noted by Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21) who argued that they struggled to 
create a contract that everyone was willing to accept, that it was “a process with constant 
changes”. 
 During our interviews, another aspect that pushed the decision, to introduce passenger 
trains on the Söderås Line, was brought up. Mats Améen (2014-05-05) argued that due to 
its location (on the west side of Scania) one important reason to develop the railway (the 
entire Freight Train Line of Scania) was the construction of the Hallandsås Tunnel. The 
Hallandsås Tunnel will create a link for traffic from Swedens’ west coast (and create a 
greater freight line, providing a connection of goods traffic from the West Coast to the 
European continent, cf. RTI-plan, 2010-2021). Therefore, it might be the case that the 
expected completion of the Hallandsås Tunnel in December 2015; pushed the contract to 
start developing the Söderås Line. 
   Despite rather long negotiations, it is important to understand that no alternative 
measures (or alternative solutions to create a better way of public transport) were really 
discussed. A tendency among the respondents was to highlight the superiority of the 
passenger train – favoring this alternative to the possibility of a further development of the 
bus lines. Birgitta Jönsson (2014-05-07), mayor of Svalöv, stated that these alternatives are 
not mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, Mats Améen (2014-05-05), pointed out that Region of 
Scania has negotiated the possibility to stop some of the current bus lines, having less than 
50 % cost coverage, along the Söderås Line (when passenger trains are introduced). Still, 
whether such a development will take place is not certain (cf. section 4.3.3). 
 
 
35 
4.3.4.1 Bargaining 
 
 We asked the respondents to explain the bargaining situation towards the other agents in 
the project (Svalöv, other Municipalities, Swedish Transport Administration and the Region 
of Scania). A tendency among some of the respondents was to describe the bargaining 
situation rather mutual, but most of the respondents from Svalöv argued that the Swedish 
Transport Administration had an advantage in the discussions. 
   Birgitta Jönsson (2014-05-07), mayor of Svalöv, pointed out that whether Bjuv would sign 
the final contract of co-financing was uncertain during a period. It was necessary to have at 
least two municipal co-financiers to close the deal. 
  Nonetheless, many of the respondents from Svalöv had less positive views on the 
relationship towards the Swedish Transport Administration. Mats Dahlberg (2014-05-07), 
environment manager, described the relationship between the municipalities and the 
Swedish Transport Administration as a “big brother and little brother”-relationship. He 
pointed out that the Swedish Transport Administration has more resources; and in the end 
they were deciding whether passenger trains ought to be introduced. Karl-Erik Kruse 
(2014-05-07), previous mayor of Svalöv, went even further in his critique. He argued that 
the “possibility to influence the contract was extremely limited”. He also pointed out that 
the bargaining, and the negotiations, is directed one-way (meaning that Svalöv have to 
adapt to decisions of the Swedish Transport Administration). Karl-Erik Kruse (2014-05-07) 
stated that “you [edi. rem. the municipalities] are either taking part of the game, or standing 
on the side – there is no room for negotiations [edi. rem. or bargaining]”. 
  During our interviews we also saw a tendency showing that the Swedish Transport 
Administration had a leading role in the discussions, and during the bargaining. Jack 
Bårström (2014-05-13), urban and regional planner at the Swedish Transport 
Administration, partly confirmed this when he noted that the Swedish Transport 
Administration has the greatest possibility to influence the negotiations.       
 In fact it was also pointed out (by Birgitta Jönsson and Karl-Erik Kruse) that co-
financing, of large infrastructure project, to a large extend is a political decision on state 
level. Birgitta Jönsson (2014-05-07) pointed out “the politics are turning fast”; which means 
that Swedish Parliament can opt out from the agreement (in other words, alter the National 
Transport Plan).  This in turns puts the municipalities in a rather unfortunate situation; and 
highlights the unequal bargaining situation that many of the respondents described. 
  Additionally, both Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21) and Birgitta Jönsson (2014-05-07) noted 
that it was of great interest to have terms of co-financing decided upon before the National 
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Transport Plan was finalized (in April 2014). Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21) stated that it 
was important to create terms that are consistent with the view of all parties and added that 
“the Swedish Transport Administration have to respond to that [edi. rem. to the question 
of whether it was important to finalize the contract before the National Transport Plan was 
accepted] – this is what they have told us”. Once again, this highlights the bargaining 
position of the construction of the Söderås Line – the Swedish Transport Administration is 
favored. 
4.3.4.2 Optimism bias/Strategic misrepresentation 
 
 It became clear during our interviews that the Söderås Line might include a high level of 
optimism bias. During our discussions it was obvious that the introduction of passenger 
trains on the Söderås Line has long been demanded by both politicians and local residents. 
Birgitta Jönsson (2014-05-07), mayor of Svalöv, said that there has been a “political 
consensus” in the municipal board in support of the introduction of passenger trains on 
the Söderås Line. Some of our participants pointed out that this was necessary as it shows 
that the municipality is determined which enables them to stand united in the negotiations. 
This could in fact contradict the notion of optimism bias, as this high level of consensus 
could be strategically beneficial in the negotiations. 
  Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21) pointed out that the 
decision to introduce passenger trains on the Söderås Line shows “a belief in the future. 
You [edi. rem. the municipality] strive towards development.” This shows the great level of 
belief in the investment. 
4.3.4.3 Information Asymmetry 
 Arguably it might be the case that a certain degree of optimism biasness has been present. 
It is important to understand that if true, this could have an impact on the ability to make 
informed decisions and in extension – to act rational. Another tendency we captured is the 
presence of information asymmetry. This could have had an impact on the municipality’s 
ability to make informed decisions regarding the final contract. 
   During our interviews it became clear that the general terms and responsibilities in the 
contract are well-defined in the contract. However, the Swedish Transport Administration 
has been writing the contract and they have provided the municipalities with the cost 
calculation. This has led to a situation where the Swedish Transport Administration has 
been providing the information, and the municipality has been receiving this information. 
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Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21), head of local government, said that “(…) it is difficult to 
question the calculations from the Swedish Transport Administration”. This is due to the 
limited amount of resources of the municipality, and these types of infrastructural 
investments are very specific and require extensive analysis (and financial ability). Hence, as 
pointed out by the respondents, no locally produced calculations have really been made on 
expected effects of the introduction of passenger trains. It was, however, pointed out that a 
few estimations have been made (though not including all socioeconomic effects associated 
with the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line). Instead of locally produced 
calculations, it was noted that the decision to a large extent was dependent on the 
calculations provided by the Swedish Transport Administration. This shows a certain 
information advantage of the Swedish Transport Administration. In fact, Jack Bårström 
(2014-05-13), urban and rural planner at the Swedish Transport Administration, pointed 
out that there has been a degree of lack of trust among the respondents from the 
Municipality of Svalöv. 
4.3.4.4 Hold- up problem 
 
 In our interviews it was made clear that large infrastructure projects (such as the Söderås 
Line) are long term investments, and these investments create partners that last for a long 
time period. 
 Mats Améen (2014-05-05), chief strategist at Skånetrafiken, noted that they (the Region of 
Skåne) have felt obliged to fulfil their commitment (since the Region of Skåne signed the 
agreement of intention in 1997, Appendix 2). Therefore it could be the case that if they 
were to take all negotiations into account then this could have created a hold-up situation 
for the agents (Region Skåne, Svalöv and the other municipalities) to the project. A 
consequence of such a hold-up could be that problems are overlooked. Still, the 
respondents from Svalöv did not agree with that notion (that the long negotiation process 
has created an early project hold-up). Mats Améen (2014-05-05) argued that it is important 
to fully commit to these types of large projects (that have long time horizon include more 
than economic mere benefits). 
   Additionally, a hold-up situation might also occur due to the long negotiations. Mats 
Dahlberg (2014-05-07) stated that “(…) it becomes harder to back out when commitments 
have been made and costs have been taken into account”. During our interviews we found 
the respondents very determined – this determination could even result in acceptance of 
cost over-runs (even if large ones were to occur). It is a long term commitment. On the 
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other hand, such an argumentation might be hasted.  During the discussions it was argued, 
as alluded earlier in this section, that long term determination is crucial to finish these types 
of deals. Also, as noted by Karl-Erik Kruse (2014-05-07), a conclusion of an early stage 
hold-up due to the long negotiation process is highly questionable. He argued that the early 
stage discussions (mainly during the 90s) did not include discussions of the finance 
structure – meaning that municipal co-financing was not really discussed. 
4.3.5 Alternative opportunities 
 
 As discussed in the earlier sections in this chapter, there was a general consensus among 
the respondents favouring the introduction of passenger trains to other ways of public 
transport. Still, as noted chapter 2, a well-rounded analysis should take other measures into 
consideration – to rule out the possibility of over-looking other more socioeconomically 
efficient alternatives. Yet, the respondents were not considering alternative solutions. It was 
also noted that the bus lines in Svalöv (and to other municipalities) have been developed; 
during the time before the agreement of co-financing was signed.  In fact, when we asked 
the respondents if any other alternative solution was considered in the discussion it was 
argued that there is no comparable way to develop the public transport system to the 
introduction of passenger trains. 
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Part B.  Questionnaire 
   Examining our interviews allowed us to discover patterns in our analysis. To see if the 
patterns that we observed in Svalöv hold, a questionnaire was constructed to extend our 
analysis. This questionnaire was sent out to every mayor in the 290 Swedish municipalities.  
4.4 Method 
  As noted, our interviews allowed us to discover different patterns. We therefore decided 
to create a questionnaire – to test the tendencies we saw in the interviews. The process of 
developing and executing the questionnaire was done step-wise. 
   The first step was to operationalize the main points emerging from our interviews and 
hence, to create questions based upon these points (cf. Part A, Chapter 4). The second step 
was to determine the appropriate person to contact in each municipality. The questions 
that emerged from the answers, from the interviews in Chapter 4 (Part A), required us to 
find someone in the organization that is well-informed of the political discussion and the 
entire organization. Also, some questions included a certain degree of normative valuation. 
This was needed to explore different individuals’ perception and view of municipal co-
financing in our interviews. What this means is that we, with the help from our interviews, 
have created questions that gives an answer to how municipal co-financing is related to 
underlying economic theory (or the economic rationales of the decision to co-finance large 
infrastructure projects).  It is important to understand that the Swedish Administrative 
chain allows for a great level of municipal independence. The head of the municipal board 
is referred to as the mayor of the municipality. This individual is leading the work in the 
municipal board, which can be viewed as the “government” of the municipality. They are 
politically elected; and they reflect the will of the voting residents (cf. Göteborg, 2014; 
Linköping, 2014). Directing our questions towards them allowed us to both take the will of 
the municipalities into consideration, as well as the will of the different regions of Sweden 
(as we asked the mayors to fill in their region). At the same time we were able to direct 
questions to someone with a leading role in the organization, with knowledge of the entire 
organization (namely the mayor). 
  The third step was to make the questionnaire easy to understand, and structurally well-
disposed. One problem was the definition. In our letter to the mayors, and in the 
questionnaire, we used the term “large infrastructure projects” (as defined in Chapter 1). 
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We then defined large infrastructure projects as road- and rail infrastructure projects which 
costs more than SEK 50 million (from all co-financiers). This is how the Swedish 
Transport Administration defines projects that are included in their National Transport 
Plan and it therefore includes projects that are comparable with the Söderås Line (with cost 
expenditures comparable to those of the introduction of passenger trains on the railway). 
We asked the respondents about road- and railway infrastructure projects in order to force 
the respondent to consider projects that are comparable with the Söderås Line (for 
instance, air-traffic or ship traffic is not a feasible to the Söderås Line). It was also brought 
to our attention, after discussions with Svalöv, that different types of co-financing projects 
exists and therefore we needed to make clarifications – which we did. The last step was to 
send out the forms to all mayors in Sweden3.  
4.5 Questions 
   This questionnaire contains of three different parts. The first part is a background part, 
aiming at categorizing the answers. Since municipal co-financing might be politically 
sensitive, we wanted to make the answers confidential. Therefore we did not ask the 
participants to name their municipality. Instead the respondents were asked to select the 
county to which the municipality belongs. The respondents were also asked to answer 
whether their municipality are, or have been, co-financing any “large infrastructure 
projects”.  
  The next section of the questionnaire asks the respondents to consider different 
statements and then state whether they “agree”, “tend to agree”, “tend to disagree” or 
“disagree” with the following,  
 
Statement 1:  Municipal co-financing allow financially strong municipalities to jump to the front of the 
queue 
 
Explanation:   According to legislative decision all co-financing is voluntary. Still, in the 
case of the Söderås Line we have seen that it was a requirement. It was 
argued that those municipalities who want to see their infrastructure 
investments become reality have to co-finance. If this is the case, then 
naturally rich municipalities would be able to see their projects prioritized. 
                                                        
3 This include going through 290 online municipal web-pages, and hours of web browsing, to find email-
addresses to each municipal mayor.  
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This is a problem, as it does not take the use of alternative measures into 
account and the expected benefits from the different investments. Less 
financially stable regions might still benefit from infrastructure investments. 
 
Statement 2:  Assessments of socioeconomic profitability are decisive for investments in large rail- and road 
infrastructure projects 
 
Explanation:   The second statement looks upon the importance of conducting a cost-
benefit analysis.    
 
Statement 3:  Some large road- and rail infrastructure projects should be executed, even if they are not 
economically profitable 
 
Explanation:   The third statement is an extension of the second question, in order to 
investigate if more than economical profitability is be considered when 
investing in infrastructure projects.  
 
Statement 4:  Agreements of municipal co-financing clearly divides the risks between the agents that sign 
the contract 
 
Explanation:   One feature of public-private partnerships is that risks are shared among 
the agents. Risk sharing supposedly creates benefits, as the agents 
themselves face less risk than they would if they themselves would carry all 
risks associated with the project. 
 
Statement 5:  Municipal co-financing moves decision to a lower administrative level 
 
Explanation:  Moving decisions to a lower level could allow decisions to be made closer 
to the residents. This could enable the possibility to make better decisions 
(as the agents can share information).  
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Statement 6: Municipalities have a great influence on the final contract 
 
Explanation:  In Svalöv the view of the influence on the final contract was polarized. 
Some argued that it was some kind of extortion, while other argued that 
they had some influence on the decision to introduce passenger train traffic. 
In the case of contracts between even agents, all partners are able to 
influence the final outcome of the project. 
 
Statement 7:  Municipal co-financing is a political question on national level 
 
Explanation:   It was argued in some of our interviews that municipal co-financing was 
been forced upon them and decided by higher level politicians. In this 
question we test whether this is something we can generalize.  
 
Statement 8: Municipal co-financing has become a standard for large road- and train infrastructure 
projects 
 
Explanation:  It is stated in the legislation that all municipal co-financing is voluntary. 
Still, it was a requirement for the introduction of the Söderås Line. In this 
question we test if municipal co-financing is a rule and not a voluntary. 
 
 These different statements allow us to use the answers from the interviews and quantify 
them, such that we can observe whether a larger pattern can be obtained. We also added a 
final, third, section in our analysis. In this section we ask the respondents to state the need 
for infrastructural investments (in roads, bus-traffic and railway traffic) on a scale. The scale 
is running from 1 to 5 (were 5 indicates large need and 1 indicates no need).  
In the third section we also asked the participants to state up to four different main reasons 
for investments in railway-traffic. This was done to control for variations and to 
understand if the rationales from the perspective of the municipality of Svalöv also holds 
for municipalities nation-wide.  
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 4.6 Results 
   We got answers from roughly 40 % of all Swedish mayors. 30 % of the respondents were 
female and 70 % were male. Actually, most Swedish mayors are male – so the gender 
differences are explainable (cf. Dagens Samhälle, 2013; Wide, 2011). 
   We received answers from all Swedish counties, except of Gotland. This is 
understandable, as Gotland is Swedens’ smallest county (containing of only one 
municipality, namely Gotland). The regions fluctuate in area size, number of citizens and 
number of municipalities.    
 
    
 
    
 
 The answers conserning the first statement showed that 72 % of the respondents either 
agree or tend to agree to the statement that municipal co-financing enables financially strong 
municipalities to jump to the front of the queue. One respondent also added that co-financing is 
beneficial for financially strong counties, meaning that differences in regions also should be 
accounted for.  
   The second figure show that 65 % of the respondents answered that they agree of tend 
to agree to the statement that assessments of socioeconomic profitability are decisive for investments in 
large rail- and road infrastructure projects.   
 
Statement 1: Municipal co-financing enables 
financially strong municipalities to jump to the 
front of the queue. 
Disagree
Tend to disagree
Tend to agree
Agree
Not certain
Statement 2: Assessments of socioeconomic 
profitability are decisive for investments in large 
rail- and road infrastructure projects
Disagree
Tend to disagree
Tend to agree
Agree
Not certain
Fig. 3: First statement Fig. 4: Second statement 
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   The third question deals with prioritization of infrastructure projects, and the importance 
of economic profitability. Roughly 68 % of the respondents answers that some projects should 
be executed even if they are not economically profitable.  The fourth statement shows a more 
polarized view, it is hard to draw any strong conclusions (or any conclusion at all) from the 
above depiction (in figure 6). According to the previous results from the interview section 
you might suspect that they would be rather decisive in their answer, stating that a division 
is made clear. On the other hand, the studies from Svalöv showed that some risks are 
linked with the municipality (for instance the risk of having to change location of the 
platforms, cf section A) and hence, not clearly defined in their nature in the contracts.  
    
 
   The fifth statement also show the polarized view as in the previous question. One main 
argument for municipal co-financing, discussed in part A, is that it allows municipalities to 
move decisions to lower level – closer to the citizens. A small majority of the responents 
answered that they would agree with this view. Nonetheless, such conclusions are hasted 
Statement 3: Some large road- and rail 
infrastructure projects should be executed, even if 
they are not economically profitable
Disagree
Tend to disagree
Tend to agree
Agree
Not certain
Statement 4: Agreements of municipal co-
financing clearly divides the risks between the 
agents that sign the contract
Disagree
Tend to disagree
Tend to agree
Agree
Not certain
Statement 5: Municipal co-financing moves 
decision to a lower administrative level
Disagree
Tend to disagree
Tend to agree
Agree
Not certain
Statement 6: Municipalities have a great 
influence on the final contract
Disagree
Tend to disagree
Tend to agree
Agree
Not certain
Fig. 5: Third statement Fig. 6: Fourth statement 
Fig. 7: Fifth statement Fig. 8: Sixth statement 
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(and with respect to our hypothesis we would expect that a larger share of the respondents 
would be agree this statement).  
   In the sixth statement we asked the respondents about the statement that municipalties have 
a great influence on the final contract. The results show that a small majority disagree or tend to 
disagree to this statement. Once again it is hard to draw any hard conclusions. 
    
 
 
   The seventh statement deals with the notion of whether municipal co-financing in reality is a 
question that are not decided on municipal level, but primarily on state level. A majority of the 
respondents (76%) agree or tend to agree with this statement. Whether this is a problem, or 
not, is not revealed in these answers. But it could contradict the governmental notion (cf. 
Chapter 3) stating that all co-financing should be voluntary (and that instead it is something 
forced upon municipalities).  Then finally, the last statement asks whether municipal co-
financing has become a standard for large infrastructure project. The previous interviews with the 
respondents from Svalöv showed a general consensus confirmining this view. Similarly, a 
majority of the responding mayors answered that they either agree or tend to agree to the 
statement (69 %).  
   In the final part of the questionnaire we asked the respondents to state the need for 
additional infrastructure improvements . This was done to control for the need for further 
investments, and hence give us a proxy of whether there might be a need to explore new 
ways to receive more fundings for infrastructural investments (such as municipal co-
financing). That said, the respondents were asked for their view on the municipal need for 
additional investments in train-, road-, and bus traffic infrastructure investments. A 
majority of the respondents answered that the need for additional investments are high 
(putting either 4 or 5 on the scale). 68,7 % answered that the need for additional 
Statement 7: Municipal co-financing is a 
political question on national level
Disagree
Tend to disagree
Tend to agree
Agree
Not certain
Statement 8: Municipal co-financing has 
become a standard for large road- and train 
infrastructure projects
Disagree
Tend to disagree
Tend to agree
Agree
Not certain
Fig. 9: Seventh statement Fig. 10: Eighth statement 
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investments in road is high, 84,3 % answered that the need for additional investments in 
railways are great and 67 % answered that the need for additional investments in bus traffic 
are great (that is putting either 4 or 5 on the scale).  
   Then, to understand the underlying rationales for the decision for the municipalities to 
co-finance infrastructure projects we asked the respondents to select (or state themselves) 
up to four main reasons for additional improvements in large infrastructure projects. 82 % 
of the respondents (92 mayors) answered that commuting was one of the main reason for 
additional investments in railway traffic. 60 % (69 mayors) answered increased 
attractiveness for the municipality, and 60 % (69 mayors) answered environmental aspects. 
Increased number of citizen was given as one of the main reasons for additional 
investments by 49,5 % or the responding mayors (57 mayors). Favoring employees was 
given as one of the main reasons for additional  rail investments by 22,5 % of the 
respondents (26 mayors). Additionally – a small fraction of the respondents answered 
recreation, environmental aspects, comfort and larger cultural offering as reasons for 
additional investments in railways.  
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
   In this report we have investigated the rationales behind municipal co-financing. This way of 
financing large infrastructure investments is becoming increasingly common. To analyze this 
concept we have examined the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line through 
in-depth interviews. We then created a questionnaire, which was sent out to Sweden’s 290 
mayors. The purpose with the questionnaire was to see if we can generalize our results. .  
 After thorough operationalization of theoretical research (which we have applied to our 
interviews and in extension to our questionnaire) we have been able to determine patterns 
and come to conclusions regarding the questions we stated in the introductory chapter. 
That is, what rationales lie behind municipal co-financing? How can this way of financing be criticized? 
And what are the positive aspects of municipal co-financing?  
   Starting with the first question – namely what rationales lie behind municipal co-financing? 
According to official documents (cf. Chapter 3) the rationale for this type of financing is 
primarily based on the assumption, and the estimations showing, that some projects ought 
to be carried out if they are benefitting the municipality – even if they are not beneficial for 
the entire country (or even the entire county). The case of the Söderås Line is emphasizing 
this. The municipality of Svalöv has for a long time demanded passenger trains – but the 
degree of cost coverage is negligible. Therefore, according to this type of argumentation, it 
should lie in the interest of the municipality to co-finance the introduction of passenger 
trains. It divides the costs between the partners who are affected by the project, and 
reflects the fact that prioritizations of municipalities differ (since non-financially viable 
projects can be carried out). At the same time, this type of agreements divides risk between 
the partners who sign the agreement. As the partners are affected by the decision to 
introduce passenger trains – they also ought to take some of the risks involved in the 
project. Still, the view on the risks is highly polarized. On one hand side, not using 
municipal co-financing might result in less incentives for municipalities to themselves act 
such that risks, and problems, with the project is taken into account. On the other hand, 
the risks are unevenly distributed across the country and between the partners. A 
municipality which is large in size but small in population, like Svalöv, have more limited 
ability to cover costs involved in these type of projects – compared to smaller and more 
populated municipalities (assuming that both municipalities have the same average tax 
income per citizen). At the same time the agreement of co-financing (in the case of the 
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Söderås Line) showed that the state has the possibility to opt out; and this is not possible 
for the municipality.   
   Another opportunity that emerges from municipal co-financing is the ability to influence 
the contract and the project itself.  This means that decisions are shared between different 
agents. We call this phenomena decision sharing. Decisions are taken by the agents who are 
actually affected by the decision to implement passenger train traffic. This means that 
decisions are made closer to the citizens (on municipal level). It can be argued that it lies in 
the interest of both agents to come up with the best possible way of solution in agreements 
of municipal co-financing (such that the resources are allocated in the best possible way).  
   Let us continue and investigate our conclusions regarding the two last questions in our 
quest. What are the positive aspects of municipal co-financing? And how can this way of financing be 
criticized?  
   First, the most important conclusion is probably that we are not dealing with two even 
partners with the same ability to influence the agreement. The Swedish Transport 
Administration has more economic strength and a larger influence on the decision to make 
a certain infrastructural investment or not. There is also a large degree of information 
asymmetry. The decision for Svalöv to introduce passenger trains on the Söderås Line was 
not based on economic calculations – but on a “belief in the future” and on the notion that 
“people want it”. This means that they, the politicians (and in extension the residents of the 
municipality), believe that passenger trains might increase the number of citizens and make 
the municipality more attractive. They believe that the passenger train traffic might help the 
labor market, increase house prices and give citizens access to comfortable travelling and 
more culture in surrounding areas as well as recreation areas.  Now – we cannot with 
certainty say that these effects will not occur. But there is certainly no way to say that they 
will occur (or state if they are worth-while). There are no estimations of effects that show 
the socio-economic effects of the introduction of passenger trains on the municipality of 
Svalöv. The municipalities do not have the tools to make informed decision, nor the ability 
to do so. The result from the questionnaire partly confirms this view. A small majority of 
the responding mayors answered either that they disagree or tend to disagree to the 
statement that municipality have a great influence on the final contract.  
  The second conclusion is that municipal co-financing might create what we have chosen to 
call “decision sharing” (said earlier in this section). A majority of the responding mayors 
agreed with the statement that municipal co-financing brings decisions to a lower level – 
closer to the citizens who live in the area were the investment is made. At the same time 
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our respondents from Svalöv had different view on the matter. Some argued that Svalöv 
was able to influence the contract, while others argued that this way of financing is 
comparable with a type of extortion were the municipalities are faced with two option – 
pay or you will not get passenger train traffic. It is argued that it in fact is some type of 
voluntary extortion – were one partner forces costs upon another partner who has to agree 
with the terms (due to the political consensus and the demands from the residents) (cf. 
discussion regarding threat point, Chapter 2). Yet, the legislation argues that all co-
financing should be voluntary (cf. section 3.1.1) – but the degree to which it is voluntary is 
highly questionable. In the case of the Söderås Line it is voluntary in the sense that they can 
either agree or disagree to the terms. Still they were able to make changes in the contract – 
but their ability to influence this contract was negligible and questionable (cf. statement 6 
and section A in chapter 5). The municipality is faced with a “take it or leave”-situation, as 
they do not have any outside options (cf. Chapter 2). Put differently, they can either accept 
the requirements (with few adjustments) from the Swedish Transport Administration – or 
be left without passenger train traffic.  
   Our third conclusion has to do with risk sharing. One of the main features of agreements of 
co-financing is that they divide the risks, such that all partners bear responsibility. 
However, in the case of the Söderås Line it was seen that the state have the opportunity to 
opt out of the investment – which is not an alternative for the municipalities agreeing to 
co-finance the introduction of passenger trains on the railway. At the same time, risks of 
financial character have clearly been divided in the contract – and the distributions of cost 
over-runs are stated. It is hard to determine if the risks are in reality shared mutually 
between the partners, or if the state opportunity to opt out puts the municipalities in a 
tough situation – as they also face the risk that decision changes on state level will put the 
project on hold – rendering the risk division uneven. This polarized view of the risk 
division was confirmed when we asked the respondents about the statement that municipal 
co-financing clearly divides the risk between the partners who agree to co-finance large 
infrastructure investments. 20 % answered that they agree, 20 % answered that they tend to 
agree, 30 % answered that tend to disagree, 21 % answered that they disagree and 9 % 
answered that they do not know. This highly polarized view does not allow us to draw any 
real conclusions regarding the risks (if they are uneven or more prevalent for the 
municipalities).  
   The fourth conclusion is that state-municipal partnerships are not comparable with public-
private partnership agreements. In public private agreements one partner is aiming towards 
50 
economic gains. But in state-municipal partnerships both agents are striving towards socio-
economic efficient use of their own resources (in relationship to the area were they act).  
Also, another difference is that a private agent is, almost, always able to decline an offer of 
partnership.  This is not always the case for municipalities. In the case of the Söderås Line 
this was due to the political pressure, large hold-up and residential demands. It seems as if 
municipal co-financing has become a necessity for those municipalities who want to see 
their infrastructural investments being made. It was certainly a requirement in the case of 
the Söderås Line. This was confirmed in our questionnaire. A majority of the responding 
mayors answered that municipal co-financing has become standard for large road- and train 
infrastructure projects.  
   The main feature of municipal co-financing is, as we discussed earlier in this section, that 
the two agents are starting from different grounds – and with different tools and financial 
ability. The municipality is not always able to conduct proper research and investigate 
whether an investment is actually suitable. This is our fifth conclusion, namely that the 
decision to co-finance for municipalities is not necessarily based on economic analysis but 
on “a belief in the future” and on the notion that “people want it”. This was also discussed 
earlier in this section. It is also a pattern we observed in our questionnaire. A majority of 
the respondents answered that assessments of socioeconomic effects are decisive for 
investments in large infrastructure projects. We then asked the respondents whether some 
projects should be conducted even if they are not economically profitable. A majority 
agreed with this statement, which further could indicate that the municipality takes more 
into account than calculations. This could be this “belief in the future” which was used as 
an argument among some respondents from Svalöv, but it could also reflect the fact that 
municipalities are acting upon a political and residential demand (a demand which is not 
necessarily built on economic research or reasoning). 
   The sixth conclusion is that interest of the municipality is in conflict with the interest of the 
state. It is in the interest of the municipality to see that this trend of increased degree of 
municipal co-financing is revoked. Still, if the state were to only build projects that are 
socio-economically beneficial – it might be the case that some projects would not have 
been conducted. It could also be the case that different agents (state, municipalities and 
regions) value different effects in different ways. For instance, Svalöv might value less car 
traffic more that the state (environmental effects). At the same time municipal co-financing 
is, according to responding mayors in our questionnaire, a question on state level politics.   
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   The seventh conclusion is that the residents of a municipality that agree to co-finance an 
investment are faced with an extra tax burden. Some municipalities do not have to co-
finance their infrastructural investments (in particular those who have had their 
infrastructural investments made before the trend of municipal co-financing started).   
  Our eighth conclusion is that it might be the case that rich municipalities, with more financial 
ability, can spend more on infrastructural investments. They can therefore have their 
projects prioritized. This was highlighted in the answers from the responding mayors when 
they were asked to consider the statement that municipal co-financing allow rich 
municipalities to jump to the front of the queue. According to economic theory, this could 
be a problem – as the costs are unevenly distributed across the country. The marginal 
productivity varies across the country, and it could be the case that benefits on the margin 
differs in different regions. The expenditures following the investment in the Söderås Line 
could have been used for alternative measures. 
  Our ninth conclusion is that a degree of hold-up problem has been present in the case of the 
Söderås Line. They have long demanded passenger trains. The agreement of intention, 
which was signed in 1997, show that two of the main partners (the Region of Scania and 
the Municipality of Svalöv) has already been agreeing to work towards an introduction of 
passenger trains. Such a hold-up could influence the ability of the agents to work 
independently, and to make the best possible use of their resources – as they have decided 
to conduct the project on forehand. However, on the other hand, the respondents from 
Svalöv argued that long term nature of infrastructure projects, and the long decision 
making process, require that agents are decisive and determined if they want to see their 
projects become reality. 
 Finally our last conclusion is that in the end municipal co-financing a way for the 
Government to decrease their financial burden. One main argument for Public-Private 
Partnerships is the greater degree from cost-sharing that stance from such agreements. 
Similarly, municipal-state agreements ought to divide costs accordingly. Still, as noted 
earlier in our thesis, it might not be socioeconomically desirable (mainly due to the 
information asymmetry, the inability for municipality to make informed decisions, the 
inability for municipality to influence the agreements etc.). 
    Conclusively, our hypothesis in the introductory chapter (section 1.3.1) stated that the 
municipality can provide the Swedish Transport Administration with information regarding 
infrastructure investments in the local municipality. At the same time the municipality 
knows what project they need, and are therefore willing to pay for the investment. We then 
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suggested that this would result in better decision making. However, in this thesis we could 
not confirm this hypothesis. The Swedish Transport Administration has been providing the 
municipalities with calculations and measures, and the municipality of Svalöv has not been 
able to produce own calculations. This has also been confirmed in the questionnaire we 
sent to Sweden’s 290 mayors (in particular in statement 5 and 6). We also observe that the 
municipality of Svalöv has been ruled by a hold-up, due to the long term commitment to 
initiate passenger train traffic on the railway. Subsequently, we cannot with say that 
municipal co-financing result in greater decision making.     
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Summary  
 In this thesis we investigate the use of municipal co-financing to finance large 
infrastructure project. We study the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line. 
The following research question is examined, 
 
 What rationales lie behind municipal co-financing? 
 
 We also state our hypothesis – suggesting that municipal co-financing result in more 
informed decisions and the municipality is willing to pay to see their investments become 
reality. In order to frame our research we give a theoretical presentation, using the theory 
of bargaining, public-private partnership, transport economics and behavioral economics.  
 We present our empirical analysis, which is divided into two parts. In the first part (Part 
A) the results from 10 in-depth interviews with decision makers, officials and politicians are 
presented. These questions are based on a questionnaire, which has been emerging from 
the theoretical presentation in this thesis. The emerging patterns from the interviews have 
been used to construct a questionnaire, which has been sent to Sweden’s 290 municipal 
mayors. This allows us to fully investigate the underlying rationales of municipal co-
financing. In conclusion, 10 main points emerge from our thesis. These three points can be 
highlighted, 
 
1. The agents do not have the same ability to influence the agreement. The Swedish Transport 
Administration provides the projections, the requirements and the calculations. The 
municipalities do not have the ability to make their own analysis. 
2. The municipality of Svalöv is faced with a “take it or leave it”-situation. They can either choose 
to agree on terms in the contract (they can make few adjustments) or be left without passenger 
train traffic. 
3. The decision to co-finance the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line was mainly 
based on a “belief in the future” and a political will to see project become reality. It was not 
based on socioeconomic analysis. 
 After all municipal co-financing is a way for the Government to decrease their financial 
burden. Municipal co-financing results in more money for investments in large 
infrastructure projects.   
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Appendix 2 
Agreement of intention 
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Appendix 3 
Questionnaire for the in-depth interviews  
 
Frågeformulär:  
Bakgrundsfrågor: 
1. Namn, position och titel 
2. Seden hur länge har du varit involverad i projektet Söderåsbanan? 
Organisationen 
Här klargörs hur organisationen ser ut som respondenten verkar i och dennes roll i projektet. 
3. Vilken roll har du i organisationen? (Vad gör du?) 
4. Vilken roll har du inom trafikverket spelat för beslutet att införa persontrafikståg på 
Söderåsbanan? 
Finansiering 
Här fokuseras på konceptet medfinansiering och den syn organisationen och respondenten har på fenomenet. 
5. Hur ser du/ni som på konceptet medfinansiering (samfinansiering)? 
Följdfråga: Vilka incitament ser du för kommunen att vara med i en 
medfinansiering? 
6. Hur ser finansieringen (av medfinansieringen) ut för [din organisation]? 
7. Vilka fördelar ser du med kommunal medfinansiering? 
8. Vilka nackdelar ser du med kommunal medfinansiering? 
Avtalet 
Fokus ligger här på det avtal som tecknats mellan kommunerna, Region Skåne/Skånetrafiken och 
Trafikverket 
9. Hur ser du på projektets samhällsekonomiska lönsamhetsbedömning?  
Följdfråga: Finns det en genomförd för efter 2009? 
10. Hur har möjligheten sett ut för kommunerna och Region Skåne att påverka?  
11. Var det av vikt att få avtalet av skott innan den nationella transportplanen? 
12. Hur har er förhandlingsposition sett ut gentemot [Region 
Skåne/Svalöv/Trafikverket]?  
13. Hur har er förhandlingssituation sett ut gentemot [Region 
Skåne/Svalöv/Trafikverket]? 
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14. Hur ser du på samtalen som förts med övriga kommuner i avtalet (Bjuv, Lomma, 
Kävlinge och Burlöv etc.)? 
15. När väl projektet först initierades. Hur såg diskussionerna ut när idén om 
Söderåsbanan utvecklades? 
Följdfråga: Planeringen av Söderåsbanan inleddes redan på 90-talet, har det påverkat 
förhandlingssituationen (risk för låsning av projektet)? 
16. Skulle projektet genomföras om det inte fanns någon medfinansiering? [Var det ett 
krav] 
Följdfråga: Varför/Varför inte? 
Åtgärdsval 
I denna del fokuseras på de alternativ som fanns med i diskussionen när Söderåsbanan initierades. 
17. Fanns några tänkbara alternativ, t ex utbyggda busslinjer, med i diskussionerna 
kring avtalet? 
18. Bilen framställs ofta som överlägsen tåget med högre flexibilitet och direkt 
anslutning till arbetsplats. Hur ställer du dig till detta? 
19. Skulle du säga att det finns andra skäl bortom de ekonomiska som gör att 
trafikverket är med och finansierar projektet? 
20. Vilket underlag har ni haft för beslutet att medfinansiera införandet av Pågatåg 
längs med Söderåsbanan 
Följdfråga: Vem har gjort analysen? 
Effekter 
Denna fokuserar på de effekter som Söderåsbanan ska få.  
21. Anta att projektet genomförs. i) Hur kommer pendlingen påverkas? ii) Hur 
kommer arbetsmarknaden påverkas? 
22. Har ni räknat på några effekter av införandet av persontågstrafik?   
Om nej/Om ja: Vad/Vem initierade beslutet? 
Om ja: Möjlighet att få tillgång till underlaget? 
Risker 
Fokus ligger här på de risker som finns med projektet och möjliga åtgärder för dessa. 
23. Vilka risker ser du med projektet? 
Följd:  Tas detta i beaktning? 
24. Hur ser du på fördelningen av risker mellan parterna som ingått avtalet? 
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25. Ser du någon risk för ”fördyrning”, alltså att kostnaderna kommer att justeras upp? 
Om ja:  Hur tas detta i beaktning?’  
 
Övrigt 
26. Har ni fört samtal med SKL? 
27. Möjlighet att få tillgång till statistik över kommunen? Demografi/Pendling/etc 
Övriga synpunkter. 
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Appendix 4 
Questionnaire addressed to Sweden’s 290 mayors 
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Appendix 5 
E-mail correspondence with Mats Améen 
 
 
